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Abstract 
 
Purpose: The climate for technical innovation has been improving in the past few years 
in China. This paper describes a case research concerning technical innovation practices 
success in three Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the manufacturing industry. 
This is executed by applying a technical innovation audit tool based on „Western‟ good 
practices.  
Methodology: Studies on technical innovation in the Chinese SOEs started in the 1990s, 
but most investigations in this field were based on statistical survey and mathematical 
modelling. In this research, case study research method, including such strategies as 
open-ended, in-depth questions, intensive interviews and observations, are applied for the 
validity of information.  
Findings: The data and results reveal that the investigated Chinese SOEs have already 
some mechanisms for innovation in place. But there is still room for improvement and 
enhancement with respect to the effect on innovation success. It is also concluded that 
benchmarking (through the application of the technical innovation audit tool) does guide 
the Chinese management toward deciding which innovation mechanisms to adopt so as to 
provide the basics for innovation success. Additionally, based on the case studies the 
interesting conclusion could be drawn: In the context of the Chinese economy in 
transition, the case companies with less openness to the market (i.e. with high 
government involvement) have a more widespread use of innovation mechanisms.  
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Practical Implication: The last finding seems to contradict the positive relationship 
between market focus and innovativeness as suggested in „Western‟ innovation 
management theories. For clarification we relate this to the way the SOEs deal with their 
adaptive cycle, thereby considering their way of dealing with (increased) complexity as 
compared to „Western‟ companies (complexity absorption versus reduction). The 
considered cases are embedded in the institutional setting of China in transition. 
Therefore, the conclusions and findings enrich the theory of transition by revealing the 
point that entering an open market abruptly may not be the solution for SOEs, which are 
rooted in a socialist economy, to become more competitive and more innovative. This 
was mostly elaborated through the influence of the two main stakeholders (i.e. 
government and customer/end user) on the openness of the SOEs and their use of 
innovation mechanisms in China, the largest socialist system of the world. 
Originality/Value: This paper is based on a doctoral research project, containing 
reliable, first hand data from the practice.  
Keywords: Innovation; State-owned enterprise (SOE); Case study; Stakeholder 
 
Introduction 
 
After two decades of gradual, piecemeal reform and opening-up, the economic 
environment of China has been changing from the centrally planned economic system to 
a more Western-like open market system. With the reform and China‟s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular, the status of the mainstream of the 
socialist economic system and the main contributors to the government‟s revenue are 
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changing. This means that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are now confronted with 
fierce challenges from the non-state sectors (such as the private economy, the township 
and village enterprises (TVEs) and the foreign-funded enterprises).  
Management of technology in China has roughly experienced three phases. Firstly, 
before the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, China had long been in a self-closed 
situation except for some technologies introduced from the former Soviet Union and East 
Europe in the 1950s. The whole country followed the basic tenets of “acting 
independently and with the initiative in one‟s own hands; reconstructing through one‟s 
own efforts”. The government set up technology standards and platforms for industries 
and let the SOEs design and produce, with no R&D activity involved in an enterprise. 
One of our case companies (i.e. LocoCo) can be regarded as a good example of this 
period. LocoCo was firstly founded as a locomotive repairing works. With the Chinese 
government importing the first locomotive from the former Soviet Union in the 1950s, 
little by little LocoCo began to own such technologies and gradually developed its own 
technology. LocoCo became, and still is the (semi-) monopolistic locomotive producer 
and supplier in the Chinese markets. In the second phase (early 1980s till mid-1980s), the 
Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises imported a large number of technologies 
under the support of the government, which saw the focus of technology management in 
this period as technology selection and project implementation (i.e. technology 
transformation) from abroad. Those imported technologies are product designs; 
manufacturing techniques and equipment; production management techniques (including 
quality assurance); auxiliary equipment; testing techniques and devices and standards 
(Gu, 1999). The third phase started in the mid-1980s till the late 1990s, the focus was on 
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the localization of imported technology, absorbing and assimilating technology from 
abroad. Thus the core of technology management in Chinese manufacturing industry 
during this period was imitation and partly improvement. Since the beginning of the 21
st
 
century, the Chinese firms are trying to construct the core competence and the indigenous 
innovation capabilities of their own. This could be regarded as the start of a fourth phase.  
With many SOEs losing their market share in the past decade, the SOEs and the 
Chinese government have been seeking to better understand management of technical 
innovation, in order to get out of this dilemma. In the mid-1990s, the issue of 
technological innovation has been called on by the Chinese government. During the late 
1990s, this issue has been put on many Chinese firms‟ agenda, drawing practitioners‟ as 
well as scholars‟ attention in studying innovation management in the Chinese context 
(see Gao, 1997; Fu, 1998; Liu, 2001). 
Based on a comprehensive literature study and their own empirical research and 
experience, Bolwijn and Kumpe (1990) developed an evolutionary model of Western 
manufacturing firms. This model describes the evolvement of large-scale manufacturing 
firms from the 1960s to the 1990s in terms of market requirement and performance 
criteria, from efficient firm via quality firm and flexible firm to innovative firm. 
According to Bolwijn and Kumpe (1990): “… the (Western) innovative firm since the 
1990s is most successful with its capabilities of creating new demand and innovating 
products and processes in a short time”. A relatively similar evolution may be recognized 
in the phases described above for the Chinese SOEs. Hence, it may be concluded that 
more attention should be paid in gaining knowledge about the SOEs‟ effectiveness of 
management of technical innovation in the changing context of China.  
 5 
Numerous Western authors have provided an answer to the questions of why to 
innovate and how to innovate (see for example, Burgelman et al., 1996; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1997; Tidd et al., 1997; Radnor and Robinson, 2000; Brockhoff et al., 2000). 
The question here is what insights of Western theories on good practices in management 
of technical innovation can contribute to the knowledge about the effectiveness of 
management of technical innovation in the changing context of Chinese SOEs. In regard 
to the transition from a centrally planned system to a market economy, many scholars 
argue that the management setting in China is changing, and a holistic viewpoint is 
needed to study the management of technical innovation in the Chinese context (see, for 
example, Fu, 1998; Liu and Gao, 1999).  
However, there are not many researches have been done concerning technical 
innovation in the Chinese context. Also, the research method is relatively singular. One 
example can be seen from Gao (1999). Gao‟s (1999) research data were based on the 6 
times of questionnaire, which were carried out by the Economics and Management 
Research Institute of Tsinghua University, the leading institute in China. Supplementary 
data were from China (science and technology) statistical yearbooks. The author himself 
used mathematical statistical method for the analysis. Another example is Wang et al. 
(2002). Without stating what research method(s) they used in their study, in their article 
they put forward strategies for large and medium state-owned enterprises‟ technological 
innovation. Wang et al. (2002) advise: “properly introduce advanced technology and 
equipment; put emphasis on assimilating and absorbing; establish and perfect interior 
innovation mechanism which is propitious to enterprise‟s technological innovations.” 
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The above literature brought us the impetus to set up our objective of this research as, 
to explore the technical innovation status of the SOEs and the possibilities for the 
application of (Western) good practices in management of technical innovation to the 
Chinese SOEs. In view of the fact that the Chinese enterprises are following the evolution 
process of the Western innovative firms, we aim to investigate the extent that innovation 
mechanisms are in use in the Chinese SOEs, by applying a technical innovation 
assessment tool that is based on Western good practices.  
This article is structured as follows. After this Introduction part, it continues to 
describe the methods used in this research, on which three case companies are selected 
and how the technical innovation audit tool developed by Chiesa et al. (1996) are used 
for data of the technical innovation status in the three Chinese SOEs. Information was 
also collected through triangulation methods (Jick, 1979) in an attempt to examine more 
deeply the cultural and behavioural activities in influencing the Chinese SOEs‟ technical 
innovation capabilities, and to validate the empirical results obtained via the use of the 
technical innovation audit tool. The empirical data are presented in a qualitative way, by 
applying the guide by Miles and Huberman
 
(1984). In the concluding section it is 
discussed that Chinese SOEs have some innovation mechanisms in place, but more could 
be done to adapt to the world level. Benchmarking (through the application of the audit 
tool) may guide management in adopting more and other appropriate innovation 
mechanisms as the basics for successful innovations. We also found that in the transition 
economy of China, SOEs with less openness to the market (i.e. with high government 
involvement) has had a more widespread use of innovation mechanisms and vice versa. 
This finding seems to contradict the positive relationship between market focus and 
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innovativeness as suggested in „Western‟ innovation management theories. The analysis 
to the case companies also enriches to a certain extent the theory of transition. It reveals 
that being open to the market is not the solution for SOEs to be more competitive and 
more innovative. In this largest socialist system of the world, the main stakeholder (i.e. 
government) still plays an important role in the openness of the SOEs and in their use of 
innovation mechanisms. To apply this point to a broader population of enterprises in 
China, more studies on both SOEs and non-SOEs need to be done, which indicates our 
future research. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Case study for this research 
Studies on technical innovation in the Chinese SOEs started in the 1990s (Fu, 1998), but 
most investigations in this field were based on statistical survey and mathematical 
modelling. However, the explanation of quantitative findings and the construction of 
theory based on those findings will ultimately have to be based on qualitative 
understanding (Meredith, 1998). Questionnaires and models are constrained by rigid 
limits, and hard to analyse the software in management of innovation, e.g., human 
behaviour (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Whereas case studies lead to new and creative 
insights, development of new theory, and have high validity with practitioners – the 
ultimate user of research (Voss et al., 2002). Yin (1994) argues that the case study is 
preferred in examining contemporary events, and when a “how” or ”why” question is 
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being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or 
no control. Case research enriches not only theory, but also the researchers themselves. 
Following Voss et al.‟s (2002) statement, “through conducting research in the field and 
being exposed to real problems, the creative insights of people at all levels of 
organizations, and the varied contexts of cases, the individual researcher will personally 
benefit from the process of conducting the research.” We would believe a case study 
approach is very important for this research work to examine more deeply the cultural 
and behavioural activities in influencing the Chinese SOEs‟ technical innovation 
capabilities. 
To keep the case research consistent and the data reliable, triangulation methods 
(Jick, 1979) were conducted in this study. Besides the Western technical innovation audit 
tool, intensive interviews with open-ended, in-depth questions and observations were 
applied. In doing so, we tried to keep all information from diverse research methods to be 
in line with each other. 
 
A Western technical innovation audit tool 
The technical innovation audit developed by Chiesa et al. (1996) is based on their process 
model (see Figure 1), which addresses the managerial processes and the organizational 
mechanisms through which innovation is performed. The model identifies four core 
processes: concept generation, product innovation, process innovation, and technology 
acquisition; and three enabling processes: the deployment of human and financial 
resources, the effective use of appropriate systems and tools, and senior management 
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leadership and direction. The outcome from these core and enabling processes is 
performance in terms of innovation and the resulting competitiveness in the marketplace. 
 
(Take in Figure 1) 
 
Their technical innovation audit incorporates an extensive Western literature on good 
practices in management of technical innovation, and, after thorough field-testing, it has 
been widely implemented in numerous UK companies. The use of the tool has helped 
those companies to identify relevant innovation mechanisms, develop innovation 
performance measures and audit innovation capability as reported in Chiesa et al. (1996). 
Chiesa et al. state that the process of innovation is strongly related to market focus 
involving the continuous monitoring of customers, competitors and market trends. They 
believe that the four core processes are inter-related, not isolated, to any innovation, and 
their process-based technical innovation model indicates that market focus is related to a 
firm‟s innovation success. This seems to suggest that their audit tool can be applied to 
firms that are market-oriented or want to be market-oriented. To facilitate communication 
and sharing of Western good practice knowledge with the Chinese managers during the 
process of our fieldwork, we chose this audit tool for the assessment of the management 
of technical innovation (status quo) of the case companies, namely, LocoCo, BusCo and 
MotorCo in central China.  
 
Sample selection 
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In this research, three state-owned manufacturing enterprises were selected as the case 
companies. They produce different products and have different production technologies, 
and focus on different markets with different sizes. They are based in the central part of 
mainland China. This selection was to avoid the case companies being in the 
(economically) developed east area or in the less developed west region of mainland 
China. 
Among the selected samples, one (i.e. LocoCo) ranked the top 500 industrial SOEs in 
China, another (i.e. BusCo) ranked the top ten of its business scope and the third (i.e. 
MotorCo) the top five producer of the like product. The first sample company employed 
around 10,000 people, and the second and the third employed over 2,400 and 6000 
people respectively. All three shared the same historical background and similar 
stakeholder compositions as traditional state-owned manufacturing companies.  
The three case companies‟ profiles are elaborated in Table I. 
 
(Take in Table I) 
 
Process of data gathering 
To ensure that comparable data was collected from each sample SOE, the same technical 
innovation assessment tool, which was translated into Chinese for this purpose, was 
delivered to the key informants. To validate the results out of the assessment tool and to 
get informed responses from the three companies, intensive interviews with open-ended, 
in-depth questions were also carried out to the key people. In chronological order, 
LocoCo, MotorCo and then BusCo were studied. The interviewees were knowledgeable 
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about their firms‟ strategic orientations and who took direct control of technological 
innovation activities of their enterprises. The people concerned were the three functional 
managers (i.e. the Production Manager, the R&D/Product Development Manager and the 
Sales and Marketing Manager) and one (vice) General Manager or vice President in 
Technology. 
Detailed explanation to the technical innovation scorecard was given to the (vice) 
General Manager or vice President in Technology and the functional managers on how to 
fill it out. For example, each item has four scales ranking from one to four, and scale four 
is considered to be the „world class‟ innovation performance (see Table II). The use of 
the four-scale ranking presented us with bias because companies came to fill in a high 
score to make their company look not too bad, which has to do with the Chinese 
traditional behaviour of “preserving of face”. Therefore we stressed consistently the 
needs for the use of innovation mechanisms instead of the individual performance of their 
company, and we kept on refreshing the scales with semi-structured, in-depth questions.  
 
(Take in Table II) 
 
Information through within-case triangulation methods was compared with their 
scoring of the innovation scorecard. By using some triangulation methods (Jick, 1979), 
we tried to keep all information from diverse research methods to be in line with each 
other. Based on our discussions with the informants of the case companies, the half point 
scale was introduced (see for example, scale 2.5 in Figure 2). The informants found 
namely that the innovation practices of their company were sometimes in between of two 
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full-point scales. In combination with data out of the technical innovation scorecard and 
the triangulation methods, the current technical innovation situation of the three SOEs is 
depicted in Figure 2. A distinctive phenomenon in Figure 2 is that LocoCo has more use 
of innovation mechanisms and a low score in market focus, whereas BusCo and MotorCo 
on the other hand, have less use of innovation mechanisms, higher score in market focus, 
and a rather low competitiveness in the market.  
 
(Take in Figure 2) 
 
Results to date 
The key information out of the three case companies, which is considered to be the 
results of the technical innovation scorecard and the triangulation methods, was collected. 
Miles and Huberman (1984) have written a guide for the analysis of and display of 
qualitative data. In brief, they encourage the use of tables to display key information, 
which more specifically for innovation research is also recommended by Radnor and 
Robinson (2000). Therefore, The key technical innovation mechanisms within the three 
case companies are displayed in Tables III and IV, which are mostly based on the results 
out of the technical innovation scorecard and the intensive interviews. The items in the 
two tables (Table III and Table IV) are the key points of Chiesa et al.‟s (1996) innovation 
process model.  
 
(Take in Table III and Table IV) 
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Table III and Table IV summarize the use of innovation mechanisms in the three 
Chinese SOEs. LocoCo shows that it has already most innovation mechanisms in place; 
BusCo shows that it has only some mechanisms in place; and MotorCo has even fewer in 
place.  
According to Chiesa et al., management of technical innovation is a process which 
consists of all four core processes and three enabling processes. Based on the technical 
innovation scorecard results and our in-depth interviews we may conclude that LocoCo‟s 
has enabling processes and mechanisms in place. LocoCo has more use of innovation 
mechanisms in their core processes, but still, there are no multi-disciplinary teams with 
early involvement in a new project or new product development. Furthermore, cross-
functional teamwork is weak; and there is almost no industrial design for market demand. 
Also based on the technical innovation scorecard results and our in-depth interviews we 
may conclude that BusCo and especially MotorCo still lack most technical innovation 
mechanisms in both core processes and enabling processes. It seems that these two 
companies do not wish to take innovation risks because they think they are short of 
capital and they cannot afford to fail. There is no new product planning, but they follow 
the popular models in the world with an inward-looking technology strategy. Also they 
miss most enabling processes such as innovation funds and human resources. We were 
told, for instance, that MotorCo‟s R&D staff in 2000 even dropped from 60 to 40. In the 
company newspaper, we read that MotorCo‟s employees were complaining about the 
leadership of the top management. 
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Therefore, it is argued that although Chinese SOEs have already some mechanisms 
for innovation in place, with respect to the effect on innovation success, there must be 
more improvement and enhancement. 
 
 
Discussion  
 
Dynamics of stakeholder composition of the three SOEs 
In her PhD thesis, Ren (2004) discussed the dynamics of stakeholder composition of 
Chinese SOEs in terms of the stakeholders‟ power, legitimacy and urgency (see Mitchell 
et al., 1997). The stakeholder compositions of the three case companies were similar, but 
stakeholders own different attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, especially the 
influence of two main stakeholders‟ roles. These stakeholders, the government and the 
end user or customer, are considered influential to three case companies‟ effectiveness of 
technical innovation management. The government/end user or customer influence on the 
different case companies showed a high/low influence on LocoCo, and a low/high 
influence on BusCo and MotorCo. This seems to be opposite to the situation in the 
Western world. Although the stakeholder situation of MotorCo and BusCo is playing in 
an open market and they are experiencing fierce competition, it does not lead to an 
increased use of innovation mechanisms. On the other hand, in the case of LocoCo, 
where the government still plays an important role, we found more use of technical 
innovation mechanisms.  
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(Take in Figure 3) 
 
Based on our studies on innovation mechanisms used in the case companies and the 
stakeholder influence discussed above, we realize that there are essentially three 
dimensions that indicate the current innovation situation of the three SOEs. This 
illustrates the relationships between the change in stakeholder situation and the use of 
innovation mechanisms: Use of innovation mechanisms, Openness to the market and 
Government protection (see Figure 3). On the one hand, LocoCo has the highest use of 
innovation mechanisms and a low position in market focus. On the other hand, BusCo 
and MotorCo have lower government protection and higher openness to the market (thus 
a higher market orientedness might be expected), but with less innovation mechanisms. 
In our research, the intriguing finding was that in the transition economy of China, the 
higher the openness to the market and lower protection of the government, the less 
innovative and competitive the company. To put it in other words, BusCo and MotorCo 
seem to have to “defend” their own “turfs”. More precisely, LocoCo is in a (semi-) 
monopoly sector with a lower openness to the market and higher protection of the 
government in various aspects, but its innovation performance is high. For MotorCo, it is 
the other way around. The interface of the openness to the market and government 
interference, and the innovation performance of BusCo are in between of LocoCo and 
MotorCo. 
In Figure 3 we see that government protection is confronted with market openness. 
LocoCo only has to deal with the government protection for financing, orders, projects, 
etc; whereas BusCo and MotorCo have to deal with the open market and the government 
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interference (e.g. personnel appointment). Thus there at least exists an administrative 
problem (see Miles et al., 1981). Based on our research we can roughly draw the 
conclusion that large-scaled Chinese SOEs like LocoCo, which in the past decades have 
saved cumulative technology and equipment and still enjoy the government‟s privileges 
in financial appraisal and industrial policies, may take the lead among the Chinese SOEs 
to be innovative in the short run. Other large and medium SOEs already „forced‟ to 
increasing market-orientedness in order to secure operational effectiveness and thus 
survival will be staying in the dilemma situation. To take the risk of investing in 
innovation may be a means of ensuring longer term strategic flexibility, but they may 
loose out on short term performance because of it. This lack of innovation may be seen as 
to “wait for the death”. This seems to oppose the Western literature and theory in which 
market-orientedness is supposed to lead to increased use of innovation mechanisms. The 
Chinese government‟s control on SOEs‟, such as personnel appointment and interference 
on managerial issues, have been found to negatively influence the vitality of the SOEs, 
especially in the aspects of technological innovation capability and creativity. This leads 
to our conclusion that in the Chinese traditionally planned (socialist-style) economy, 
social, political and institutional effects still have dominant impact on SOEs‟ innovation 
competitiveness. Major stakeholders‟ influence, like the government, on technical 
innovation is prominent, and this is especially true for the transitional economic situation 
of China. Such stakeholders are important for the management of technical innovation of 
the Chinese SOEs because they provide the SOEs with scarce resources, which determine 
the smooth implementation of technical innovation. 
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What we could find was the shift of stakeholder composition of the SOEs. But, as 
indicated before, we found no evidence that SOEs that were forced to become more open 
to the market, became more innovative in product and process than those who are still in 
the semi-closed market despite of industrial maturity. Surprisingly, the government 
opened the market and let the companies alone in financing, but still interferes the SOEs 
with personnel appointment, managerial instructions and so on. The research also 
substantiates that incurring debt motivates managers to sacrifice long-term investment in 
favour of short-term cash flow. This is mainly the result of the government‟s interference 
of personnel appointment in a more competitive and less protected situation.  
In the innovation process model of Chiesa et al., for example, the market trend is also 
seen as the main driving force for carrying out technical innovation, indicating that 
Western firms in competitive situations take innovation as a means to increase 
competitiveness in the marketplace. One would expect that with the opening of the 
market, the Chinese SOEs, when confronted with the market situation, would generate 
industrial technological innovation within the firms and bring more orders from the 
market more or less automatically. But this did not happen in our three cases, and it even 
seems to go the other way around. Looking for explanations for all these facts, we first 
turn to Miles et al.‟s (1981) theoretical framework for the analysis of organizations in 
their adaptive processes. 
 
Adaptive processes at the case companies 
With China‟s reform and opening-up policy, the three SOEs have had to adapt 
themselves to the changing economic environment, although each is doing in a different 
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pace. In mature organizations, management must solve each of these problems (i.e. the 
entrepreneurial problem, the engineering problem, and the administrative problem) 
simultaneously, and such organizational problems in the adaptive cycle are the critical 
determinants of organizational structure and process, and further the strategic types (i.e. 
Defenders, Analyzers, and Prospectors) of organizations (see Miles et al., 1981). 
According to the characteristics of the strategic types of organizations identified by Miles 
et al., the three case companies in this research could be firstly mapped into the category 
of Defenders. Their success comes primarily from efficiently serving a stable domain and 
whose primary risk is that of ineffectiveness. Started as a Defender, BusCo and MotorCo 
held the administrative problem of how to maintain strict control of the organization in 
order to ensure efficiency. As a result, their administrative system as well as technology 
are ideally suited to maintain stability and efficiency, but are not well suited to locating 
and responding to new product or market opportunities. In the process of adaptation, 
these two SOEs were confronted with the open market situation, and they managed to 
adjust their entrepreneurial problem and engineering problem from a Defender to an 
Analyser, with the characteristic of attempting to minimize risk while maximizing the 
opportunity for profit. On the one hand, especially in the design of their administrative 
system and organization, they still have the characteristic of a Defender, trying to keep 
the current fairly stable set of products and customer or client group; on the other hand, 
they wish to expand new products or new markets. That can be the reason why product 
imitation for them is accomplished only when the most successful product or market 
innovations developed by prominent Prospectors are adopted. 
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Miles et al. (1981) state, “The successful Analyser must be able to respond quickly 
when following the lead of key Prospectors while at the same time maintaining operating 
efficiency in its stable product and market areas.” However, BusCo and MotorCo‟s use of 
innovation mechanisms and their competitiveness in the market, and MotorCo‟s in 
particular, were showing the adaptive cycle of a Reactor – responding inappropriately to 
environmental change and uncertainty, performing poorly as a result, and then being 
reluctant to act pro-actively in the future. According to Miles et al., this was because of 
the “lagging” aspect of the administrative system in the adaptation process. In other 
words, in the process of adaptation, BusCo and MotorCo‟s entrepreneurial problem and 
engineering problem were moving towards the characteristics of an Analyser, but their 
administrative problem made their performance lagging behind. 
However, Miles et al.‟s theory does not seem to be workable to LocoCo. Also started 
as a Defender, in its adaptive process during the economic environment in transition in 
China. But LocoCo‟s privileged position, i.e. being in a (half) monopoly industry with 
the protection of the government, provided it with advantages to have the tendency to 
become a Prospector. There is no risk for LocoCo to conduct new project and new 
product development. Maintaining the reputation as an innovator in product and market 
development is as important as, perhaps even more important than high profitability. 
Therefore LocoCo‟s prime capability is that of finding and exploiting new product and 
market opportunities. This finding might be interpreted to be opposite to Miles et al., who 
seem to suggest that in a non-open environment there would be no need for pro-active 
innovation. They say for example “Unless an organization exists in a “protected” 
environment such as monopolistic or highly-regulated industry, it cannot continue to 
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behave as a Reactor indefinitely (Miles et al., 1981)”. It seems that without an explicit 
need for it, LocoCo is already pro-actively concerned with its strategic flexibility by 
employing innovation mechanisms. BusCo and MotorCo are defending their domestic 
market, while LocoCo is trying to expand for international market share, which fits for 
the characteristics of an Analyser. As demonstrated in Bolwijn and Kumpe‟s evolution 
model, most proactive Western firms are already over 30 years developing from efficient 
firms till today‟s innovative firms (but most are still „lagging behind‟ in other phases). 
Our findings clearly illustrate that Chinese SOEs cannot do it by just a quantum leap, just 
because the Chinese government artificially and abruptly opens up the market. 
Although the framework of Miles et al. does not fully explain our findings, putting 
the research results in terms of their framework does help to interpret the findings better. 
We are now able to discuss the peculiarities of how the case companies deal with the 
adaptive processes from the viewpoint of two characteristics of China‟s social system.  
On the one hand the way of dealing with (increasing) complexity in China which differs 
from the „West‟, and on the other hand the fact that it is a socialist system in transition.  
 
Complexity absorption versus complexity reduction 
Organizations are adaptive systems in complex environments (Boisot and Child, 1999). 
In their study, Boisot and Child stated that historical factors have shaped the nature of 
complexity in China, with the social tradition and political economy generating high 
levels of cognitive complexity and pushing China‟s economic organizations in the 
direction of complexity absorption through more intense systems of relationships. 
Moreover, China is the worlds largest socialist system, the norms and regulations 
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developed in this system, and the strong networks waved among the clans and families 
and friends made this society even more complex.   
Miles et al.‟s theory could not explain why the three case companies were in such 
different situations of their adaptive cycles compared to their Western counterparts. 
However, Boisot and Child‟s complexity absorption and complexity reduction helps to 
shed a different light on the matter. Unlike Western firms that are familiar with the 
strategy of complexity reduction, the Chinese companies are good at complexity 
absorption, among many other things, and culturally more attuned to the complex 
Chinese context. The inclination to deal with complexity by way of absorption may be 
part of the explanation why BusCo and MotorCo face much more turbulence and change 
in their stakeholders‟ composition and influence. Apart from „defending‟ themselves to 
survive in the short run, they have not been able to move towards the internal stimulation 
of using more innovation mechanisms, and the benefit from which would be expected 
only in the longer run. The more protected and shielded environment from LocoCo may 
have provided the right climate in which complexity absorption can foster strategic 
flexibility and adopting innovation mechanisms. LocoCo‟s codification and abstraction in 
this climate may have better facilitated the process of diffusion and thus partly account 
for better performance. The question is whether complexity reduction in the cases of 
BusCo and MotorCo might have led to different results.  
 
 
A socialist economy in transition 
 22 
In their technical innovation process model, Chiesa et al. indicate that firms that are 
market-oriented would be more innovative. “Market-oriented” firms to a certain extent 
refer to those that are proactive to adapt to dynamic and continuous changes in the 
environment. The Chinese socialist economy in transition may be compared to the 
developments in Germany when the socialist East was re-united with the capitalist West. 
Specifically we cite work from Kogut and Zander concerning the “twin” Zeiss companies 
(Kogut and Zander, forthcoming), which technically are more or less identical: Zeiss Jena 
(East Germany) and Zeiss Oberkochen (West Germany) with their patent records from 
1950 to 1990. However, “Zeiss Jena gradually developed considerable technological 
capabilities, …technologically viable firms can fail in the initial period of transition from 
socialism to capitalism (Kogut, and Zander, forthcoming)”. Based on these experiences, 
and our findings at LocoCo, the Chinese government might be better advised to let the 
SOEs go very carefully with their technical innovation during its socialist system in 
transition. China now seems to be a rather opened up market, but this openness is a 
governmental activity. The government artificially created the open market for the 
Chinese SOEs by introducing competitions and regulations, but leaving the SOEs 
structure and managerial process with little change, would not automatically result in 
more innovation initiatives of the SOEs.  
The analysis of the three Chinese SOEs in this article clarifies a phenomenon 
happened in the socialist economy in transition. Innovation in LocoCo, to a certain 
extent, is an extension of government plan since it is the government that initiates large 
innovation projects. This political arrangement or planned innovation economically 
protected LocoCo from market competition so that it became relatively innovative, 
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among others. Whereas early market-oriented SOEs, like BusCo and MotorCo in this 
research, failed to be innovative without sufficient government protection for some time 
because their products were not critical to the nation‟s strategic development. In addition, 
the pressure coming from political interference did not harm the protected firm‟s top 
management, but frustrate the enthusiasms of those managers whose companies were 
more exposed in the competitive market. These results have important implications for 
the theory of transition.  
The findings of the study and Chiesa et al.‟s good practice benchmarking idea also 
provided the SOEs‟ managers with fresh insight into their ongoing innovation activities. 
Some realized which innovation mechanisms should adopt so as to provide the basics for 
innovation success. All the three companies assured that external factors influence the 
organization‟s innovation. The government‟s role in operation and management is 
gradually declining, but the consistent administrative control (i.e., personnel 
appointment) to the SOEs constrained the SOE managers‟ innovation initiatives. 
Managers believed that basically they the internal innovation activities were under their 
control, but external factors had influence on the innovativeness of their firms. They also 
agreed that with effective management and incentive mechanism, good innovation 
outcomes could be realized, and company indigenous technology development ability 
would accelerate as it develops its own technology generating capability. 
 
 
Further research  
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By doing case research, the authors realized that the major stakeholders of Chinese SOEs 
have had significant influences on their openness to the market, their technical innovation 
capabilities and use of innovation mechanisms. More case studies need to be conducted 
to see how this is applicable to other Chinese firms. Factors such as the extent of market 
openness, the government influences, company size, innovation input and output, etc. 
will be considered. Not only the state-owned and non-state-owned, but also the emerging 
phenomenon of Chinese enterprises operating abroad could also be studied to compare 
with the research results.  
In order to test the research results, the authors submitted a research proposal together 
with a Chinese institute for a further research. The joint research proposal (titled 
Management of Technical Innovation of the Chinese Firms in the Transition Economy) has 
recently been approved by the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (Netherlands) and the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (China). This future research will focus on specific 
stakeholders‟ influence on the company‟s openness to the market and innovation 
mechanisms. This is to obtain knowledge about the way management of technical innovation 
taking place in China, to what extent and in what respect it differs from the Western „best 
practices‟ and if these differences can be explained by the way Chinese management teams deal 
with environmental complexity. This includes whether and how Chinese enterprises, which 
wish to globalise in the world market, can make positive use of the strategies of 
complexity absorption or perhaps should be advised to turn to the strategies of 
complexity reduction in operating in a different cultural and institutional environment. 
The expected research results are aimed to contribute to the theory of transition, to provide 
insights for appropriate government policies in China‟s socialist system in transition, and 
to help Chinese enterprises in their transition to market oriented companies. 
 25 
 
 
References 
 
Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1999), “Organizations as adaptive systems in complex 
environments: The case of China”, Organization Science, Vol 10 No 3, May-June, pp. 
237-52 
Bolwijn, P.T. and Kumpe, T. (1990), “Manufacturing in the 1990‟s – productivity, 
flexibility and innovation”, Long Range Planning, Vol 23 No 4, pp. 44-57 
Brockhoff, K.K., Pearson, A.W., de Weerd-Nederhof, P.C. and Kerssens-van Drongelen, 
I.C. (2000), Technology readings in management: A selection from 10 European 
Doctoral Summer Schools, Twente University Press, Enschede, the Netherlands 
Burgelman, R.A., Maidique, M.A. and Wheelwright, S.C. (1996), Strategic management 
of technology and innovation (2
nd
 edn), Boston: Inwin/Mcgraw-Hill 
Chiesa, V., Coughlan, P. and Voss, C. (1996), “Development of a technical innovation 
audit”, Journal of Production Innovation Management, 13, pp. 105-36 
Clark, K. and Fujimoto, T. (1991), Product development performance, Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston, Mass. 
Fu, J. (1998), Technological innovation (Ed.), Tsinghua University Press, Beijing 
Gao, J. (1997), Analysis on innovation in the Chinese firms, Tsinghua University Press, 
Beijing 
Gu, S. (1999), China‟s industrial technology, Market reform and organizational change, 
Routledge, London and New York 
 26 
Jick, T.D. (1979), “Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action”, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 24, pp. 602-11 
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (2000), “Did socialism fail to innovate? A natural experiment 
of the two Zeiss companies”, American Sociological Review, Vol 65 No 2, pp. 169-190 
Liu, W. and Gao, M. (1999), The restructuring of state-owned enterprises in transition, 
Shanghai Far East Press 
Liu, Y. (2001), Enterprise innovation, China Economics Press, Beijing 
Meredith, J. (1998), “Building operations management theory through case and field 
research”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol 16, pp. 441-54 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1984), Qualitative data analysis: A source of new 
methods, Sage, London 
Miles, R.E., Snow, C.C., Meyer, A.D. and Coleman, Jr., H.J. (1981), “Organizational 
strategy, structure, and process (1978)”, re-printed in M. Jelinek, J.A.  Litterer and R.E. 
Miles (Ed.), Organization by design: Theory and practice, Business Publications, Inc, 
Plano, Texas 75075 
Mitchell, R.K., Agle, B.R. and Wood, D.J. (1997), “Toward a stakeholder identification 
and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts”, Academy of 
Management Review, 22, pp. 203-25 
Radnor, A. and Robinson, J. (2000) “Benchmarking Innovation: A short report”, 
Creativity and Innovation Management, Vol 9 No 1, pp. 3-13 
Ren, L. (2004), Management of technical innovation in Chinese state-owned enterprises: 
Case studies from a stakeholder perspective, PhD Thesis, University of Twente, 
Enschede, the Netherlands 
 27 
Tidd, J., Bessant, J. and Pavitt, K. (1997), Managing innovation: Integrating 
technological, market and organizational change, Wiley, Chichester, England 
Tushman, M.L. and Anderson, P.C. (1997), Managing strategic innovation and change: a 
collection of readings, New York: Oxford 
Voss, C., Tsikriktsis, N. and Frohlich, M. (2002), “Case research in operations 
management”, International Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol 22 No 
2, pp.195-219 
Wang, Q., Cao, Z. and Zhang, M. (2002), “Some problems and proposals on innovation 
mechanism of large and medium state-owned enterprises”, in Xu, Q., Wu, X. and Chen, 
J. (Ed.), Management of technology and innovation in the 21
st
 century, Proceeding of 3
rd
 
International Symposium on Management of Technology and Innovation (ISMOT „02), 
Zhejiang University Press, Hangzhou, pp. 15-17 
Yin, K. (1994), Case study research: Design and methods (2
nd
 edn), Sage Publications, 
California 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Systems & Tools 
Leadership 
Market Focus 
Increased 
Competitive- 
ness 
Concept Generation Product Innovation 
Process Innovation Technology Acquisition 
  Enabling Processes 
Processes of Innovation 
Resourcing 
Figure 1. A Process-based Innovation Model  (Source: Chiesa et al., 1996) 
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Table I. Profile of Case Companies 
 
Name in Short Innovation Features 
 
LocoCo 
 
 
 
 
 
BusCo 
 
 
 
 
MotorCo 
 
Top management involvement 
Strong R&D, including a national-level R&D Center 
Diverse sources of technology 
An outward-looking focus for innovation process 
Enjoy government privilege, no need to worry about orders 
 
Breakout of profit losses 
Customer-oriented production and marketing 
Some technology links with a local university 
70% are group buyers, innovation is to meet their needs and tastes 
 
Strong imitation strategy for the latest model(s) in the world 
Good distribution channels 
Years of profit losing makes the top management thinking of strategic 
change in core business due to some government limitations in selling its 
products in cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II. An Example of the Technical Innovation Assessment Scorecard (Source: Chiesa, et al., 1996) 
 
1 2 3 4 
Process Innovation 
Generating Process Innovations 
Serious differences between 
process requirements and 
technology available. 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of New Processes 
No attention to implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuous Improvement 
If it isn‟t broken, leave it alone. 
 
 
No manufacturing strategy: 
process technology bought 
off the shelf. 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation seen as 
installation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Focus on maintenance of 
processes, not improvement. 
 
 
Manufacturing strategy 
ensures that process 
capabilities support market 
needs. Investment in 
improving existing and 
developing technologies. 
 
 
Cross-functional 
implementation teams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Need for continuous 
improvement of processes 
recognized – primarily the 
responsibility of process 
engineering function. 
 
 
Strong links between product 
and process development. 
Information on new process 
technology actively sought and 
new processes tested to gain 
experience. 
 
 
Implementation teams stay 
together into full production to 
ensure learning and 
improvement. Active 
involvement. Active 
involvement of suppliers. 
 
 
Work teams encouraged to 
identify opportunities for 
improvement. Use of wide 
range of internal and external 
data to support improvement. 
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Figure 2. A Linear Description of the Innovation Mechanisms Used in the Three SOEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Table III. The Core Processes of the Innovation Process 
 
 LocoCo BusCo MotorCo 
 
Product innovation planning 
Innovation rewards 
Innovation risk-taking 
Use of multi-discipline teams 
with early involvement 
Cross functional teamwork 
Employees involved in 
continuous improvement 
Industrial design 
Diversified technology sources 
Technology strategy identified 
New ideas from: 
 
 
Yes 
Yes 
(No risk) 
No 
 
Some 
Yes 
 
No 
Yes 
Outward-looking 
R&D 
Global competitors 
Local customer needs 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
 
No 
Some 
 
Some 
No 
Inward-looking 
Customer demands 
Suppliers 
Competitors 
N/A 
No 
No 
No 
 
No 
No 
 
Some 
No 
Inward-looking 
Competitors 
Marketing 
Special magazines 
 
    Note: According to Chiesa et al. (1996) the core processes of the innovation process consist of concept  
              generation, product innovation, process innovation and technology acquirement. 
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    Table IV. The Enabling Processes of the Innovation Process 
 
 LocoCo BusCo MotorCo 
 
Top management involvement 
Clear innovation goals 
Management attention to 
encourage innovation 
Training program for staff 
Innovation process properly 
funded 
Intranet and internet used to 
facilitate information and 
design 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Yes 
(Short-term) 
No 
 
No 
No 
 
Some 
No 
(Short-term) 
No 
 
No 
No 
 
Some 
    Note: According to Chiesa et al. (1996) the enabling processes of the innovation process consist of  
              leadership, resourcing and systems and tools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 BusCo 
(Medium performance) 
 MotorCo 
   (Low performance) 
 LocoCo 
(High performance) 
Figure 3. The Relationships between Openness to the Market and 
Government Protection and the Use of Innovation Mechanisms in the 
Three Chinese SOEs. 
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